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Background: Globally, extending financial protection and equitable access to health services to those outside the
formal sector employment is a major challenge for achieving universal coverage. While some favour contributory
schemes, others have embraced tax-funded health service cover for those outside the formal sector. This paper
critically examines the issue of how to cover those outside the formal sector through the lens of stakeholder views
on the proposed one-time premium payment (OTPP) policy in Ghana.
Discussion: Ghana in 2004 implemented a National Health Insurance Scheme, based on a contributory model
where service benefits are restricted to those who contribute (with some groups exempted from contributing), as
the policy direction for moving towards universal coverage. In 2008, the OTPP system was proposed as an
alternative way of ensuring coverage for those outside formal sector employment. There are divergent stakeholder
views with regard to the meaning of the one-time premium and how it will be financed and sustained. Our
stakeholder interviews indicate that the underlying issue being debated is whether the current contributory NHIS
model for those outside the formal employment sector should be maintained or whether services for this group
should be tax funded. However, the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives are not being explored in
an explicit or systematic way and are obscured by the considerable confusion about the likely design of the OTPP
policy. We attempt to contribute to the broader debate about how best to fund coverage for those outside the
formal sector by unpacking some of these issues and pointing to the empirical evidence needed to shed even
further light on appropriate funding mechanisms for universal health systems.
Summary: The Ghanaian debate on OTPP is related to one of the most important challenges facing low- and
middle-income countries seeking to achieve a universal health care system. It is critical that there is more extensive
debate on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative funding mechanisms, supported by a solid evidence
base, and with the policy objective of universal coverage providing the guiding light.
Keywords: Universal health care coverage, National health insurance, Policy objective, Policy options, Those outside
formal sector employment, Tax funding, One-time premium payment, GhanaBackground
Member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO)
committed themselves in 2005 to implementing universal
health systems [1,2]. A universal health system aims to en-
sure that all residents have adequate access to needed
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumout-of-pocket payments for health care at the time of ill-
ness [2,3]. Health care financing systems that pool
resources and risk through taxes and/or mandatory insur-
ance contributions are the main instruments for achieving
universal coverage in health care [2,4].
Ghana made a bold move in introducing a National
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2004, and has made
considerable progress towards the goal of universal
coverage. A key challenge facing Ghana, and many other
low- and middle-income countries [5], is how to expand
coverage to everyone given the large proportion of theCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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This population includes those who work in the informal
sector (e.g. street vendors, minibus taxi drivers), subsist-
ence farmers and those who are not involved in any pro-
ductive economic activities. There has been heated
debate on this issue within Ghana [6,7] and the current
government has proposed introducing a ‘one-time NHIS
premium payment (OTPP) policy’ as a means of provid-
ing financial protection to those outside the formal
sector.
There are divergent approaches internationally as to
how best to pursue universal coverage in countries with
small formal employment sectors. On the one hand,
some favour “contributory schemes” where every house-
hold is expected to contribute to an insurance scheme
(as in Ghana, Rwanda, the Philippines and Vietnam),
while others (such as Thailand) entirely tax fund health
service cover for all those outside the formal sector [5].
There is, however, consensus that where a contributory
approach is adopted, general tax funds (and/or some-
times donor funds or innovative financing such as taxes
on financial transactions, airline tickets, mobile phone
companies and unhealthy foods or diaspora bonds) are
required to fund contributions for the poor and other
vulnerable groups. The key distinction between the two
approaches is that a contributory system only offers
health service benefits to those who contribute (whether
the contribution is made by the individual directly or on
their behalf from tax or donor funds) whereas tax fund-
ing creates an entitlement to service benefits for all out-
side the formal employment sector.
The core of the debate is the need to generate revenue
to fund health services from as broad a population base
as possible. In some contexts, there is a commonly held
view that those engaged in informal sector activities are
able to (i.e. have sufficient income) and should (i.e. a
value judgement) contribute to this revenue pool, and
that the burden of funding health services should not be
placed entirely on formal sector workers.
This paper critically examines the issue of how to
cover those outside the formal sector through the lens
of stakeholder views on the proposed OTPP in Ghana,
in order to contribute to current debates on the national
health insurance reforms in Ghana and broader inter-
national debates on covering those outside the formal
sector. This is because stakeholder opinions are essential
ingredients for understanding the political dynamics sur-
rounding a policy issue and hence the feasibility of
implementing a proposed policy. The paper draws on
data collected between November 2010 and February
2011 through 28 in-depth interviews with politicians,
technocrats, academics and labour unions in Accra,
health workers and staff of two District Mutual Health
Insurance Schemes (DMHIS), one in the north and theother in the south of the country, 6 focus group discus-
sions with intended beneficiaries in the two districts,
and a review of media reports on the policy issue (see
[8] for a full description of the methods and results of
the stakeholder analysis).
Discussion
Historical context of health care financing in Ghana
During the colonial period, health care in Ghana was
funded through out-of-pocket payments [9]. This
restricted access to modern health services to a privi-
leged minority because most people could not afford the
fees. Immediately after independence in 1957, health
care in all public facilities was fully funded from general
tax revenue [10]. This tax-funded system was not sus-
tained due to economic recession in the 1970s, which
negatively affected government revenue and spending on
health care. It was therefore abandoned in favour of the
introduction of nominal user fees in the early 1970s.
Substantial fee payments at the point of service were
introduced in 1985, popularly known as the “cash-and-
carry” system, based on a loan conditionality imposed by
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
under a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
[11,12]. Under the “cash-and-carry system”, exemptions
were introduced for the aged, pregnant women and the
very poor, but they were ineffectively implemented
[13,14]. Community-based health insurance schemes
emerged in the 1990s to cover user fees but they had
limited population coverage [15].
In 2004, arising from an election campaign promise, a
mandatory National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)
was introduced by the then ruling NPP to replace out-
of-pocket payments for health care, with the ultimate
goal of achieving universal coverage [16]. The NHIS is
designed as a contributory system, i.e. all Ghanaians are
expected to make some form of insurance contribution
(although some are subsidised or exempted) and only
those who contribute can benefit from the NHIS.
The NHIS contribution of most formal sector worker’s
takes the form of a monthly deduction equivalent to
2.5% of the payroll from the worker’s contribution to the
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)
pension fund [10]. Though some formal sector workers
such as some university employees are on a different
pension scheme and hence are not members of SSNIT,
the majority of formal sector workers in Ghana are
SSNIT contributors. These SSNIT contributors have
been assured through section 78 (3) of the NHIS Act
(Act 650) that the deductions from their pension fund
contributions will not affect their future pension pay-
ment [10,17]. The pension payment will be based on the
full 17.5% of payroll contributions to SSNIT and not the
remaining 15% after the 2.5% deduction for the NHIS.
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form of loan to government, although given that SSNIT
has a surplus at present, it is unclear whether there will
be a need for repayment or whether this can be viewed
as an absolute health insurance premium by formal sec-
tor workers belonging to SSNIT. Apart from a token
GH¢ 4 NHI registration renewal fee paid annually by
every NHIS member, SSNIT contributors are exempted
from making direct premium payments to their District
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) with which
all Ghanaians are required to register. Only non-SSNIT
contributors, comprising mainly those outside the for-
mal sector and the few formal sector workers who are
not covered by the SSNIT pension fund, are required to
make an annual premium contribution to their DMHIS
before they are covered by the NHIS. The premiums are
supposed to be structured according to ability-to-pay,
ranging from GH¢ 7.20 for the lower to GH¢ 48 for the
upper socio-economic groups. However, because of diffi-
culties in assessing household income levels, many
DMHIS have fixed the premium as a flat figure within
this range [18]. Children below 18 years, the aged (70+),
pregnant women, SSNIT pensioners and indigents are
entitled to NHI membership while being exempted from
premium payments, though the implementation of these
exemptions appears to have been poor.
The contributions via SSNIT and premium payments by
non-SSNIT formal sector workers and those outside the
formal employment sector account for a relatively small
share of NHIS revenue (SSNIT contributions account for
23% of revenue and premiums from non-SSNIT formal
sector workers and those outside the formal sector for 5%
of revenue). About 70% of the NHIS funds come from a
2.5% National Health Insurance (NHI) levy placed on all
goods and services that attract valued added tax (VAT)
[19,20]. Thus, in reality the NHIS is largely tax-funded. Al-
though every Ghanaian contributes to the NHIS through
the NHI levy, those households outside the formal sector
who are not able to pay the annual insurance premium
and who are not granted a premium exemption do not
have the opportunity of benefiting from the NHI levy and
other government revenue channelled to the NHIS. A
number of studies have revealed that the poor and infor-
mal sector workers are less frequently enrolled in the
NHIS [6,21-25], partly because of the requirement to pay
an annual premium [25]. This raises questions about
equity in the current operation of the NHIS and the ability
of the scheme to achieve universal coverage if the annual
premium is maintained.
The proposed one-time NHIS premium payment (OTPP)
policy
In 2008, the current ruling NDC party (which was the
opposition party when the NHIS was introduced) madean election promise to implement a universal health in-
surance system which “will guarantee access to free
health care in all public health institutions” [26]. A one-
time premium payment (OTPP) system was proposed to
achieve this policy objective. Since there is currently no
formal policy proposal in the public domain, the NDC
manifesto remains the main official document on this
policy. The policy has been very controversial and highly
politicised within Ghana and internationally [6-8].
OTPP debate
Evidence from our recent stakeholder analysis [8] indi-
cates that there is no consensus among stakeholders
with regard to the meaning of the one-time premium or
how the OTPP will be calculated. Some, mainly politi-
cians of the ruling party, civil society organisations and
the population outside the formal employment sector,
argue that a one-time premium should require Gha-
naians to pay a once-off token amount that is not signifi-
cantly higher than the current annual premium level, in
order to benefit freely from health care for their entire
lifetime. This implies that health care will be almost fully
funded from tax revenue. However, other stakeholders
(mainly opposition politicians, technocrats and some
academics) argue that since the manifesto stated that it
would be a premium (one-time premium), then it means
that an actuarially determined premium [27] based on
the net present value (NPV) of all future premiums will
have to be calculated for a single life-time payment [28].
Our study shows that few stakeholders are likely to sup-
port an OTPP based on the NPV of lifetime NHIS con-
tributions, because it will not be affordable to most
households outside the formal sector [8].
This indicates that stakeholders see the OTPP policy
as representing two broad policy options, which are in
line with the different international approaches to cover-
ing those outside the formal sector: 1) removing the
current premiums for those outside the formal sector
(and potentially non-SSNIT formal sector workers) and
fully tax-funding (potentially using indirect taxes) service
benefits for this group; and 2) maintaining the contribu-
tory NHIS model.
Although the detailed interviews with stakeholders
allow us to distill that the underlying debate relates to
contestation between these two alternative financing
approaches [8], the public face of the debate focuses on
the confusion created by the name given to the policy
proposal, in the sense that most stakeholders are asking
“what does a one-time premium payment mean”. The
stakeholder interviews also indicate that a key factor
underlying opposition to the OTPP proposal by some
stakeholders is that it could represent a move away from
what is seen as the already entrenched policy direction
of a contributory scheme. For example, one academic
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is a political nonsense. It doesn’t conform to any health
insurance. If it is a tax-based system, I would understand
it but not under the National Health Insurance System”.
Similar views were expressed by other interviewees, such
as an opposition politician who indicated that: “from my
personal understanding, one-time premium payment is
really not insurance; if it is just about paying a registra-
tion fee then that becomes like a National Health Ser-
vice, akin to the British”.
There are examples of countries which have changed
course in their health care financing policies. For ex-
ample, Thailand changed from a contributory system for
covering those outside the formal employment sector to
tax funding services for this group [5]. In order to assess
whether such a shift is appropriate or not in the Ghan-
aian context, it may be helpful to consider explicitly the
advantages and disadvantages of these alternative fund-
ing approaches from the perspective of key stakeholders,
and to identify what evidence is needed to provide an
empirical basis for policy decision-making.
Key issues in critically evaluating alternative approaches
for covering those outside the formal sector in Ghana
From the evidence gathered in our recent stakeholder
analysis [8] and a review of existing literature, the fol-
lowing potential advantages and disadvantages can be
raised about the alternative approaches to funding ser-
vices for those outside the formal employment sector
within the Ghanaian context. While there are a small
number of formal sector workers who are not members
of SSNIT (such as some university employees) and are
therefore also required to pay premiums directly to the
DMHIS, we are focusing here on those outside the for-
mal employment sector.
If the current contributory premium system is main-
tained, the following may be the advantages:
 It will continue to provide an additional source of
revenue for the NHIS.
 The collection of the annual premium is a source of
employment for some people (premium collectors).
 Paying a premium may instil in clients a sense of
ownership of the scheme and make them
individually feel responsible for their health and
health care.
However, the disadvantages of maintaining the current
system include:
 The collection of premiums from the informal
sector in Ghana is time-consuming, expensive and
sometimes associated with fraud on the part of
premium collectors [25], yet informal sectorpremiums only constitute about 5% of NHIS
revenue [20].
 The requirement of paying a premium for
enrolment denies those outside the formal sector
who cannot afford these payments and cannot
secure premium exemptions access to health care
and benefits from the NHI levy and other tax
subsidies to the NHIS.
 These contributions are very regressive since they
are often fixed at a flat amount and hence impose a
higher burden of NHIS payments on the poor [12].
For instance, the bottom 20% of the population
contributes 3.85% of their consumption expenditure
as informal sector premiums while the top 20%
contributes only 0.27% [25].
On the other hand, the arguments that can be
advanced for tax-funded cover for those outside the for-
mal sector include:
 It will promote equity in financing as tax funding is
progressive in Ghana (not only personal income
taxes but also most indirect taxes, including VAT)
[18,25]. For instance, the poorest 20% of the
Ghanaian population spends only 2% of their
consumption expenditure on VAT, while the richest
20% spends 3.5% of their consumption expenditure
on VAT [25]. It will also promote equity in access to
health care as all will have financial protection
against the burden of the “cash and carry system”
which still faces those who are not members of the
NHIS.
 Taxes are easier to collect than insurance premiums
as tax collection mechanisms are already well
established. For example, there are already
mechanisms for collecting VAT and other indirect
taxes in Ghana while income taxes are directly
deducted from the payroll.
Its disadvantages however include:
 Ghanaians are often not willing to accept additional
(general) taxation [29]. In contrast, people may be
more likely to accept payment of insurance
premiums from which they receive specific health
service benefits [30,31].
 It may be difficult to sustain a largely tax-funded
system in Ghana in the context of high population
growth and associated increasing demand on publicly
funded health services, economic instability and
citizens’ lack of trust in the continued existence of
political commitment to tax funding of health services.
 An inevitable increase in utilisation of health care
under a largely tax-funded system in the midst of
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personnel will increase the workload of providers.
This can lead to overcrowding at health facilities,
delays in seeing patients, poor attitude of health
providers towards clients and hence, can negatively
affect the quality and efficiency of health service
provision in Ghana.
Empirical evidence, such as quantifying the costs of
collecting insurance premiums from those outside the
formal sector to assess the net revenue generation from
the current contributory system, and the revenue gener-
ating potential of different forms of tax, would contrib-
ute to a constructive debate on how best to fund a
universal health system in Ghana. It is important to rec-
ognise that some of the issues raised above, such as util-
isation increases and inadequate staffing levels, will exist
irrespective of whether health care is funded from insur-
ance premiums or taxes. Such issues therefore need to
be addressed through other policy instruments; for ex-
ample, addressing utilisation increases through effective
primary care gate-keeping.
In engaging in this debate, it is important to acknow-
ledge that the core objective of the current insurance
contributions is to raise revenue from the informal sec-
tor. Given that there are other ways of generating rev-
enue from this group, for example through indirect
taxes, what would be the best way to raise this revenue?
From an efficiency point of view, it is undoubtedly more
efficient (in terms of net revenue generation after taking
account of collection costs) to collect indirect taxes from
the informal sector than insurance premiums. House-
hold survey data can be used to identify the goods and
services purchased by those in the informal sector who
could be regarded as being able to contribute to funding
health care but are not widely used by poor households
so as to better target an indirect tax that could be dedi-
cated to health care funding. From an equity perspective,
is it really feasible and administratively efficient to iden-
tify those who are unable to afford insurance premiums
in order to exempt them and provide financial protec-
tion and needed care to all residents or it is more feas-
ible to collect revenue through other mechanisms (e.g.
indirect taxes) from those in the informal sector with
the ability-to-pay? It also needs to be explored whether
collecting informal sector contributions through (ear-
marked) indirect taxes will really have an impact on
(ownership) perceptions of the health system if residents
are aware that the taxes paid by them are used to cater
for their health care.
Even if these issues were thoroughly explored and con-
sidered, a key remaining issue would be the financial
feasibility and sustainability of moving towards tax fund-
ing of cover for those outside the formal sector. The lackof an explicit indication of how the OTPP policy would
be funded, and lack of evidence that this funding mech-
anism could generate the required resources, is possibly
the greatest deficiency in the OTPP policy proposal.
Ghana has led the way in demonstrating the revenue
generating power of dedicated indirect taxes, through its
2.5% VAT levy which generates 70% of the revenue of
the NHIS. However, it is not clear whether a further in-
crease in VAT will be possible, whether oil revenues
could be used to co-fund the NHI or whether other in-
direct taxes or innovative financing options (e.g. such as
levies on large and profitable companies as with the 10%
levy on mobile phone companies in Gabon [2]) could be
explored.
Finally, it is important to recognise that improving
equity and efficiency in financing will not by itself trans-
late into universal access to needed health care; add-
itional efforts are required to reduce physical barriers to
access (e.g. through increasing the number of primary
care facilities, increasing staffing levels and improving
the routine availability of essential medicines within fa-
cilities). Thus, the current debate about the OTPP is
only one aspect of the challenges facing Ghana in its
highly regarded efforts to pursue universal coverage.
Summary
The Ghanaian debate on OTPP is clouded by the confu-
sion about the potential content of the policy. Stake-
holder interviews indicate that the underlying issue in
the debate about this policy is whether the current con-
tributory NHIS model for those outside the formal sec-
tor should be maintained or the annual premiums
should be removed so that health care is largely funded
from (potentially earmarked indirect) taxes. Switching to
an earmarked tax-funded system may have greater pro-
spects for achieving universal coverage in Ghana, but, as
pointed out by some, the current Ghanaian economic
environment may not be favourable for its immediate
implementation [7]. Nevertheless, there would be value
in assessing whether it should at least be considered as
the strategic direction of the NHIS. Other funding
sources such as oil revenues and/or innovative financing
mechanisms could also be considered.
The OTPP debate also touches on issues of social
values in Ghana. It points to an underlying debate about
whether poor people should have some personal direct
financial responsibility for their health care (arguments
for an annual premium or an actuarially determined sin-
gle premium) versus the right to health care for poor
people without the direct payment of a premium (argu-
ments for indirect tax-based financing that subsidizes
healthcare for all regardless of income status).
The challenge of how best to ensure that those outside
the formal sector are provided with financial protection
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possibly the most important issue facing low- and
middle-income countries wishing to pursue universal
coverage. It is critical that there is more extensive debate
on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative
approaches to funding services for this group, supported
by a solid evidence base, and with the policy objective of
universal coverage providing the guiding light.
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